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Plaintiff/Appellee Utah Transit Authority ("UTA") files this brief in response to 
the brief filed by Defendant/Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (the 
"Union"). 
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102 (LexisNexis 
2009) and 78B-11-129 (LexisNexis 2008), in that the Union has filed a notice of appeal 
of a district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration within the time specified 
in Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in denying the Union's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and in granting UTA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the ground 
that the underlying dispute in this case - whether UTA violated Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-
813(2) by failing to bargain with the Union in good faith - was subject to resolution in 
Utah's courts of general jurisdiction and not by arbitration? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996) 
("A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law which 
we review for correctness."). 
2. Should the underlying case be dismissed as moot because a judgment on 
the merits would no longer provide meaningful relief to the prevailing party? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue to be decided by this Court in the first 
instance. Accordingly, there is no applicable standard of review. 
6 
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I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. i 
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration 
filed by Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (the "Union") and 
granting a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority 
("UTA"). UTA's motion for partial summary judgment sought a determination by the 
district court that the underlying dispute between the parties was not subject to 
arbitration. 
UTA filed its complaint in the district court on April 23, 2010. The complaint
 ( 
sought a declaratory judgment that (1) under UTA's "13(c) Arrangement" the issue of 
impasse was subject to resolution in the district court and not by arbitration; and (2) that 
i 
UTA and the Union were at impasse in their collective bargaining on December 21, 2009, 
when UTA unilaterally modified the terms and conditions of employment for UTA 
employees in the bargaining unit. The Union responded only by filing a motion to * 
compel arbitration; it never answered UTA's complaint. Shortly after the Union filed its 
motion to compel arbitration, UTA filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking 
a determination that the question of whether UTA violated Utah law in unilaterally 
implementing changed terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009 was 
an issue for decision by the district court, not by an arbitrator. 
These competing motions were fully briefed and then argued before the district 
court on July 9, 2010. The district court issued its "Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" on 
7 
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September 7, 2010. On September 16, 2010, the Union filed a "Motion to Amend Ruling 
on Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment." The parties subsequently stipulated to an "Amended Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment," which the district court issued on November 10, 2010. On November 23, 
2010, the Union filed its Notice of Appeal. 
2. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
UTA is a Utah public transit district with operations in several Utah counties along 
the Wasatch Front and headquarters in Salt Lake County. Record at 95, f 2. The Union 
is an unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County. Record at 
96,13. 
UTA filed this case in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the 
issue of whether the parties had reached an "impasse" in bargaining was to be decided by 
a court, not an arbitrator; and (2) UTA had bargained in good faith to impasse and was 
therefore at liberty to unilaterally implement changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment consistent with its bargaining proposals. Record at 5. The Union never 
filed an Answer to UTA's Complaint. The Union has sought no affirmative relief It has 
only sought an order that the parties must arbitrate the issues UTA presented to the 
district court in its Complaint. Record at 62-64. 
At the time the Complaint was filed, the then-most recent collective bargaining 
agreement between UTA and the Union had expired on December 21, 2009 (at the 
conclusion of a short extension agreed by the parties from December 10), without the 
8 
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parties having agreed on a replacement CBA. Record at 96, ^ 5. As a result, there was 
no collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time that this case was initiated in the 
district court, and negotiations over a replacement CBA had been discontinued. Record 
at 96, f^ 7. Although negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, UTA and the Union had 
begun negotiating over a replacement CBA in August 2009, and met approximately 14 
times from August through December. UTA contended that it had fulfilled its duty to 
negotiate in good faith to the point of impasse, and that the parties had in fact reached an 
impasse in bargaining. Record at 96, % 6. Based on its declaration of impasse, and after 
the expiration of the CBA on December 21, 2009, UTA implemented changes to the 
employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of its actions. 
Record at 96, f 8. 
In addition to collective bargaining agreements that UTA and the Union have 
entered into over the years, UTA and the Union are also subject to an "arrangement" 
pursuant to Section 13(c) ("13(c) Arrangement") of the Urban Mass Transportation Act 
of 1964 (49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2005)), which requires in general that public transit 
agencies that receive federal funds make "protective arrangements" for the benefit of 
employees. Record at 97, Tf 10. 
Pursuant to the 13(c) Arrangement, either UTA or the Union has the option of 
invoking "fact-finding" proceedings in the event that the parties are not able to reach 
agreement after 60 days of bargaining over a collective bargaining agreement. In fact-
finding, the parties present their positions concerning the subjects of bargaining to a 
9 
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neutral fact-finder, who then makes non-binding recommendations for resolving the 
dispute. Record at 97, ^J12. 
The 13(c) Arrangement includes the following statement, which is found in the 
description of the fact-finding procedures: "The terms and conditions of any expiring 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties shall remain in place following 
expiration of such agreement, unless otherwise mutually agreed in writing by the parties, 
until the conclusion of the fact-finding proceedings." Record at 91 (§ 9(g) of the 13(c) 
Arrangement). 
As of the time of filing the Complaint below, neither UTA nor the Union had 
invoked fact-finding. UTA asserted the position that the limitation on unilateral action 
stated in § 9(g) had no effect unless and until fact-finding was invoked by either party. 
Arbitration Board's Opinion and Award, Exhibit A to Affidavit of Rodney Dunn 
("Arbitration Award"), at 16.1 
The 13(c) Arrangement provides for arbitration, at the election of either party, of 
disputes between the parties regarding only the "application, interpretation, or 
enforcement" of the 13(c) Arrangement. Record at 97, ^ f 15. Pursuant to this provision, 
the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether the 13(c) Arrangement, specifically 
11 (9)(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement, prohibited UTA from modifying the terms and 
conditions of employment on December 21, 2009. Record at 97, f^ 16. However, 
although the Union proposed that the parties also arbitrate the issue of whether UTA 
bargained in good faith to impasse, UTA declined on the ground that those issues were 
1
 The Dunn Affidavit, including relevant excerpts from the Arbitration Award, is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
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not within the scope of the arbitration clause in the 13(c) Arrangement. Record at 98, 
1117. 
On December 15, 2010, the neutral arbitrator in the arbitration between UTA and 
Local 382 rendered his decision. Arbitration Award at 36. The arbitrator ruled that 
1 (9)(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement precluded UTA from unilaterally implementing any 
change to the terms and conditions of the expiring collective bargaining agreement until 
it had first completed the fact-finding proceedings set forth in the 13(c) Arrangement. 
Award at 35. In addition, the arbitrator ruled that UTA was required to reinstate the 
terms and conditions of the expiring collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration Award 
at 35. 
Subsequent to the arbitrator's decision, the parties entered into negotiations which 
resulted in a successor collective bargaining agreement effective April 1, 2011 and 
continuing to December 10, 2011. Dunn Affidavit, Addendum A, at 1fl[ 5-6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The question of whether UTA negotiated in good faith to impasse must be decided 
by Utah's courts of general jurisdiction, not by an out-of-state arbitrator. As declared by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the labor protective provisions of the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964 require that public transit workers are accorded collective 
bargaining rights, but under state laws, as enforced in state courts. Thus, although UTA's 
13(c) Arrangement includes an obligation to collectively bargain with the representatives of 
UTA's employees, that obligation has application only if the state has failed to enact laws 
that provide collective bargaining rights. Thus, enforcement of Utah state collective 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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bargaining laws by state courts takes precedence over enforcement of the 13(c) 
Arrangement by arbitration. The 13(c) Arrangement does not provide for arbitration of 
statutory disputes, but only violations of the Arrangement itself 
The Union's allegations in this case are akin to "unfair labor practices" in the private 
sector, and unfair labor practices are not arbitrated, but are litigated before the National 
Labor Relations Board, the federal circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. On the 
other hand, labor arbitrators typically do not deal with unfair labor practices, but instead 
address alleged violations of specific collective bargaining agreements. For this reason, the 
Union is incorrect in arguing that arbitrators have special expertise in resolving unfair labor 
practices. They do not have expertise in this area, and state court judges are capable of 
resolving such disputes. 
In addition, providing for adjudication of this dispute will allow Utah labor law to be 
developed by Utah judges issuing public opinions that are subject to appeal, not by nearly 
unreviewable arbitration awards issued privately by arbitrators. In fact, because Utah has 
relatively few unionized workplaces, the vast majority of arbitrators are based outside Utah, 
and it is very unlikely that any disputes between UTA and the Union would ever be 
arbitrated before an arbitrator based in Utah. Accordingly, allowing enforcement by 
arbitration would frustrate the development of Utah's own labor law in Utah's state courts, 
and would effectively cede to arbitrators the ability to declare the fundamental rights of 
Utah employees. For these reasons, the Union's motion to compel arbitration was properly 
denied by the district court. 
Response to Union's Memorandum in Opposition to Suggestion of Mootness. 
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The underlying dispute in this case - whether UTA bargained in good faith to 
impasse - is clearly moot by reason of the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute regarding the 
meaning of the status quo provision in the 13(c) Arrangement and the negotiation of a new 
collective bargaining agreement in response. There is no further remedy to be provided 
beyond the arbitrator's order that UTA restore the status quo ante. Nor is the underlying 
dispute within the scope of the public interest exception. Although the dispute is a matter of 
public concern, it is unlikely to arise again because of the requirement that UTA engage in 
fact-finding before making unilateral changes, regardless whether UTA has bargained in 
good faith to impasse. In addition, if it does recur, there is no reason to expect that it would 
evade review. 
Notwithstanding that the underlying dispute is moot, UTA agrees that the specific 
question on appeal, that is, whether alleged violations of the duty to bargain in good faith 
are subject to resolution in the courts or by an arbitrator, is not moot. That particular issue is 
a matter of public concern, is likely to recur, and could evade review. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE QUESTION WHETHER UTA NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH TO 
THE POINT OF IMPASSE MUST BE DECIDED BY UTAH'S COURTS OF 
GENERAL JURISDICTION. 
The question of whether UTA complied with its duty under Utah law to negotiate in 
good faith with the Union to the point of impasse must be decided by Utah's courts of 
general jurisdiction, and not by a labor arbitrator, because although the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964 ("UMTA") requires that federally-funded local transit districts 
provide for the continuation of collective bargaining rights for their employees, Congress 
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intended that those collective bargaining rights be provided through state laws, and enforced 
by state courts. This point was declared by the Supreme Court and cannot be avoided. See 
Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27-28 
(1982) (stating that federal law required the continuation of collective bargaining rights for 
public transit employees, but that "state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the 
application of state [labor] policy to local government transit labor relations"). 
In compliance with the UMTA, the Utah State Legislature has enacted a series of 
statutes providing collective bargaining rights for transit employees, culminating in the 
current version, found at Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813 (LexisNexis 2007). Accordingly, 
the underlying issue is whether UTA, in negotiating with the Union, complied with Utah 
state law, and that underlying issue is not subject to the dispute resolution procedures set 
forth in the 13(c) Arrangement; rather, it must be decided by the state courts, and ultimately 
this Court. 
The Union attempts to minimize the Jackson Transit ruling by entirely omitting any 
reference to the Supreme Court's actual language, and instead reporting only part of the 
case, i.e., that "the subject Section 13(c) Arrangement must be enforced in Utah courts and 
using primarily Utah law." Union's Brief at 13. As shown below, Jackson Transit requires 
more. Not only must the 13(c) Arrangement be interpreted using state law, the labor laws 
applied to UTA's actions in this case must in fact be Utah labor laws, and those laws must 
be interpreted and applied by Utah courts. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. UTA'S LABOR RELATIONS ARE GOVERNED BY UTAH STATE 
LAW. 
UTA's labor relations are directly governed by the following Utah Code provision: 
17B-2a-813. Rights, benefits, and protective conditions for employees 
of a public transit district - Strike prohibited - Employees of an 
acquired transit system. 
(1) The rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and 
remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 
49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a 
public transit district's establishment and operation of a public transit 
service or system. 
(2) (a) Employees of a public transit system established and operated by 
a public transit district have the right to: 
(i) self-organization; 
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and 
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing. 
(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor organizations 
may not join in a strike against the public transit system operated by the 
public transit district. 
(c) Each public transit district shall: 
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization 
representing a majority of the district's employees in an appropriate unit 
with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and welfare, 
pension, and retirement provisions; and 
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization, enter into 
and execute a written contract incorporating the agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813. This code provision was enacted to comply with 
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act ("UMTA"), as specifically stated in 
subsection (1). Id. at § 813(1); see Burke v. Utah Transit Authority, 462 F.3d 1253, 
1258-59 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 813's predecessor was enacted to comply with 
Section 13(c)). Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal financial assistance for 
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public transit districts, that states guarantee to transit employees, among other things, the 
continuation of "collective bargaining rights." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2). 
However, although it is federal law that requires states to provide basic collective 
bargaining rights as a condition of federal transit funding, these rights are still to be 
provided and enforced under state law. In Jackson Transit, the Supreme Court 
considered the question whether a cause of action for breach of a "13(c) arrangement" 
was properly asserted in state or federal court. The Court held that such claims were to 
be brought in state court, based upon its determination that Congress intended to preserve 
state control over the labor relations of public transit districts. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. 
at 27-28 (1982). 
The Supreme Court's analysis of this issue is instructive. The Court itemized 
repeated references during the Congressional debates that stated the intent of the 
UMTA's sponsors that labor relations between a public transit district and its employees 
would continue to be governed by state law. For example, the Senate Committee Report 
on the proposed law stated "'In regard to the question as to whether these provisions 
would supersede State labor laws, the committee concurs in a statement made by the 
Secretary of Labor that there could be no superseding of State laws by a provision of this 
kind.'" 457 U.S. at 25 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82, 88* Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Based on these and other Congressional statements, the Court 
declared that "While the statutory language supplies no definitive answer, the legislative 
history is conclusive. A consistent theme runs throughout the consideration of § 13(c): 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments 
would be controlled by state law." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
The Court ultimately concluded with this interpretation of Section 13(c) and the 
role of state law: 
Thus, Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a 
body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local 
governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would not 
supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government 
employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would < 
retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local 
government transit labor relations. Congress intended that § 13(c) would 
be an important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit 
workers, by ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid 
could be used to convert private companies into public entities. <l 
Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27-28 (1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In short, 
Congress intended that state law and state courts should govern the collective bargaining 
4 
rights of public transit workers. 
B. UTAH STATE LAW MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL 
LABOR POLICY, BUT IT IS STILL STATE LAW TO BE 
ENFORCED BY STATE COURTS. i 
While the Supreme Court in Jackson Transit declared that transit labor relations 
were to be governed by state law in compliance with Section 13(c), the Court did not . 
explain the role, if any, to be played by federal law. This question was answered by a 
federal appeals court in the case of Amalgamated Transit Union International v. 
i 
Donovan, 767 F.2d 939, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986). 
The Donovan court held that although collective bargaining rights are to be provided by 
state law, they must be consistent with "federal labor policy." Donovan, 767 F.2d at 948- I 
17 
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49. The court then gave the following definition of "collective bargaining/5 which it held 
must be provided by state law to be consistent with "federal labor policy": "Then as 
now, collective bargaining was universally understood to require, at a minimum, good 
faith negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment." 767 F.2d at 949 (emphasis in original). Thus, state 
statutes enacted to comply with Section 13(c) must provide for the continuation of 
"collective bargaining rights," which include, at a minimum, the duty to bargain in good 
faith to impasse, if necessary. Id. 
Based on Jackson Transit and Donovan, the roles of the state and federal 
governments in labor relations for public transit districts are clear: transit labor relations 
are governed by state labor laws and enforced through remedies provided by those laws. 
However, those state laws must incorporate the basics of federal labor policy, which 
means that they must "require, at a minimum, good faith negotiations, to a point of 
impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 
Accordingly, Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 ("Section 813"), which was enacted to 
comply with Section 13(c), and which explicitly provides collective bargaining rights to 
employees of public transit districts in Utah, logically must be interpreted to include these 
minimum rights as explained by Donovan. Therefore, UTA has a duty - under Utah state 
law - to recognize and bargain with the representative of its employees in good faith to 
impasse, if necessary. 
Given the Supreme Court's express direction in Jackson Transit, it is plain that the 
Union's demand to arbitrate the underlying dispute in this case - that is, whether UTA 
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bargained in good faith to the point of impasse - directly contravenes the intent of 
Congress and cannot be granted. On the contrary, this is manifestly an issue of state law 
that must be decided by state courts. 
C. ACCEPTING THE UNION'S POSITION WOULD FRUSTRATE 
THE INTENT OF CONGRESS IN ENACTING THE UMTA AND 
INTERFERE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UTAH LABOR LAW. 
In seeking an order compelling arbitration, the Union ignores the Supreme Court's 
direction in Jackson Transit and instead points to UTA's 13(c) Arrangement, which 
includes a requirement that UTA provide for the continuation of collective bargaining, as 
well as an arbitration clause. Indeed, the Union quotes language from the 13(c) 
Arrangement that, taken out of context, appears to create an independent duty to 
collectively bargain with the Union. See Union Brief at 24-25 (quoting 13(c) 
Arrangement at <[} 3). The Union then cites to the 13(c) Arrangement's arbitration clause, 
and argues that UTA must arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good faith, as if 
If 3 of the 13(c) Arrangement somehow preempts the statutory requirement found in 
Section 813. Id. 
Accepting the Union's argument in these circumstances, however, would frustrate 
the intent of the UMTA (as explained by the Supreme Court) and would interfere in the 
orderly development of Utah labor law. Even assuming that % 3 of the 13(c) 
Arrangement does constitute a direct promise on the part of UTA to engage in collective 
bargaining, the mere presence of such a promise does not preempt the clearly 
independent obligation found in Section 813. In short, if ^ 3 means what the Union says 
it means, then UTA has an obligation under both the 13(c) Arrangement and under 
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Section 813 to bargain collectively with the Union, and the question is which obligation 
takes precedence when both arguably apply. That question is answered by the Supreme 
Court's declaration that Section 13(c) requires that states, as a condition of receiving 
federal transit assistance, must provide for the continuation of collective bargaining 
rights, but that such rights are to be supplied by state law, and that those state laws are to 
be interpreted and applied by the state courts. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27-28. 
Allowing an arbitrator to decide these issues would effectively cede control of 
state labor laws to the federal government, contrary to the Supreme Court's direction in 
Jackson Transit. As a practical matter, the decision of an arbitrator can be appealed only 
under very limited circumstances - mere disagreement with the language of the 13(c) 
Arrangement is not enough. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(setting forth the bases for vacating an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration Act). 
Therefore, the language of f 3 would effectively never come to the courts for a de novo 
interpretation, and the courts would never be able to interpret it. Furthermore, Section 
813 would not ever come before the courts for interpretation because, as the Union seems 
to argue, such a claim would effectively be preempted by <([ 3 of the 13(c) Arrangement. 
This "enforcement" of Section 813 would entirely exclude Utah's courts, contrary to the 
intent of the UMTA. 
D. PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE 13(c) IS A "BELT AND SUSPENDERS9 
PROVISION THAT APPLIES ONLY IF THERE WERE NO 
APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTE. 
Interpreted in the light of UMTA5 s intent, ^ 3 is clearly a "belt and suspenders" 
provision that would come into play only if there were no applicable statute. For 
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example, if the state legislature were to amend Section 813 to restrict or eliminate the 
collective bargaining rights accorded to transit employees, f^ 3 would ensure that such 
rights would be accorded to UTA's employees as a matter of agreement. And in that 
situation, UTA would be required to arbitrate any claim that it had violated «f 3 by, for 
example, failing to bargain in good faith, or implementing unilateral changes without first 
negotiating to impasse. However, because transit employees in Utah are accorded these 
rights by statute, then the rule of Jackson Transit applies, and the statute takes precedence 
and must be enforced by Utah courts. 
E. SECTION 813'S REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 
DOES NOT MEAN STATUTORY DISPUTES MUST BE 
ARBITRATED. 
There is no support for the Union's argument that the 13(c) Arrangement 
"contemplates that disputes over violations of state law protecting collective bargaining 
rights are subject to arbitration.'5 Union's Brief at 30. The Union asserts this argument 
based on Section 813's reference to the Secretary of Labor and the Supreme Court's 
holding that a union may lawfully agree to the arbitration of statutory claims. Id. at 30-
31. These purported reasons do not support the Union's argument. 
Section 813 states that 
The rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies 
of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. 
Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a public 
transit district's establishment and operation of a public transit service or 
system. 
Utah Code Aim. § 17B-2a-813(l). This does not say, as the Union apparently contends, 
that Utah has ceded its labor relations law to the Secretary of Labor. Rather, this 
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subsection properly authorizes public transit districts to comply with the UMTA, 
including compliance with protective arrangements that must be certified by the 
Secretary of Labor as adequately protective of employees. 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b). 
Furthermore, Subsection (1) is followed by Subsection (2), which affirmatively 
sets forth the collective bargaining rights of transit employees, as provided by state law. 
Subsection (2) does not indicate that these rights are to be enforced pursuant to 
procedures in the 13(c) Arrangement; nor does it indicate that such collective bargaining 
rights themselves are found in the 13(c) Arrangement. In addition, even assuming for the 
sake of argument that UTA could agree to arbitrate statutory violations, there is no 
reference to arbitration of such rights. Indeed, Subsection (2) of Section 813 is plainly 
enacted in response to Utah's duty under Section 13(c) to provide for the continuation of 
collective bargaining rights under state law. No other interpretation complies with the 
intent of the UMTA as declared in Jackson Transit. 
Finally, the Section 13(c) Arrangement itself contains no reference to Utah law, 
and the Arrangement's arbitration provision does not include any duty to arbitration 
statutory violations. For these reasons, the 13(c) Arrangement does not contemplate 
arbitration of statutory claims. 
F. THE UNION'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION 
CONFLICT WITH THE INTENT OF CONGRESS AS DECLARED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
The Union's arguments in favor of arbitration cannot be allowed to overcome the 
clear intent of Congress that labor relations for public transit employees continue to be 
governed by state law and enforced in state courts. 
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1. Public Policy Favors Arbitration Only Where the Parties have 
Agreed, and UTA Did Not Agree to Arbitrate this Dispute. 
The Union asks this Court to compel arbitration based on federal and state policies 
encouraging arbitration. However, these policies require arbitration only where the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute at issue. The Utah Uniform I 
Arbitration Act provides that, in response to a motion to compel arbitration, "[i]f the 
court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not... order the parties to 
i 
arbitrate. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(3). In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 2004 UT App 310, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
Utah Arbitration Act precludes an order of arbitration in the absence of an enforceable i 
agreement to arbitrate. 2004 UT App 310 at ffif 15-16. This accords with federal labor 
law, which does not require an employer to arbitrate disputes with a labor union unless 
the employer has agreed to do so: 
The first principle gleaned from the trilogy is that "arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 
which he has not agreed so to submit. This axiom recognizes the fact that 
arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties 
have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration. 
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 ^ 
(1986) (citations omitted). The mere presence of an arbitration agreement is insufficient, 
because "a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is 
i 
satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute" Granite Rock Co. v. InVl 
B'hood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2856 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, UTA has never agreed to arbitrate claimed violations of Section 813, i 
23 
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whether in its collective bargaining agreement or in the 13(c) Arrangement. The Union 
has not suggested that UTA's collective bargaining agreement requires arbitration of this 
dispute, and the 13(c) Arrangement contains only a limited arbitration agreement. 
Section 8(a) of the 13(c) Arrangement limits arbitration to disputes "regarding the 
application, interpretation, or enforcement of this Arrangement." 13(c) Arrangement, 
Record at 88, § (8)(a). It does not cover this dispute, which is based on Utah labor law 
(specifically, Section 813), not the 13(c) Arrangement. Thus, the state and federal 
policies in favor of arbitration do not apply in this case because the dispute at issue does 
not involve an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and Jackson 
Transit requires that Utah state law - Section 813 - provide the collective bargaining 
rights claimed by the Union. Moreover, the parties did not agree to arbitrate alleged 
violations of Utah law. 
2. Arbitrators do not have Special Expertise in Deciding Fundamental 
Labor Law Issues and State Court Judges are Capable of Deciding 
Such Issues. 
The Union also argues that labor arbitrators have expertise in deciding claims that 
a party in collective bargaining failed to bargain in good faith or failed to bargain to 
impasse, and that state courts are not able to decide such issues. Union Brief at 30-31. 
This contention is incorrect. 
Labor arbitrators typically do not address charges of an alleged failure to bargain 
in good faith. Arbitrators are typically called upon only to resolve disputes over the 
application of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, not fundamental labor law 
issues such as whether a party has bargained in good faith. See Elkouri & Elkouri, How 
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Arbitration Works Ch. 10.3.A.v.a.(l) (6th ed. 2003) ("the arbitrator's decisional authority 
is limited to contractual issues; the arbitrator does not have the inherent authority to 
decide issues concerning compliance with the NLRA"). Thus, virtually all collective 
bargaining agreements include dispute resolution procedures that consist of grievance and 
arbitration, but these procedures typically only address alleged violations of the 
agreement, not any and all disputes between the parties, or between an employee and the 
company. An alleged failure to bargain in good faith would not violate the collective 4 
bargaining agreement. 
On the contrary, in the private sector a failure to bargain in good faith is a 
I 
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, and is adjudicated by the 
National Labor Relations Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1974) ("It shall be an unfair 
labor practice for an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the ' 
representatives of his employees"); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1984) (explaining procedure for 
adjudicating unfair labor practices). The Board investigates charges alleging unfair labor 
practices and, where appropriate, authorizes a complaint to be filed and a hearing before 
an administrative law judge. Id. at § 160(b). The ALJ decision can then be appealed to 
4 
the Board itself, and the Board's decisions can be appealed to the federal courts of 
appeals and from there to the Supreme Court. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).2 Arbitrators have 
nothing to do with this process. 4 
Consequently, arbitrators have no special expertise in deciding these issues. They 
2
 In addition, since the Board's orders are not self-executing, the Board must also 
petition a federal court of appeals for enforcement. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 
25 
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deal with private disputes concerning alleged violations of a particular collective 
bargaining agreement between a union and a particular employer, while the NLRB and 
federal courts decide alleged statutory violations that involve matters of public concern. 
Similarly, Utah's labor relations laws should be decided by the courts, not private 
arbitrators.3 
Second, Utah's state court judges are capable of deciding labor law issues raised 
by Section 813, including whether UTA has bargained in good faith to impasse. Like 
other legal questions that come before the courts, deciding a labor law issue would 
require finding facts and then applying law. Both UTA and the Union would call 
witnesses to testify about facts such as (1) how many bargaining sessions were held and 
the length of those sessions; (2) whether the parties had an opportunity to discuss all 
issues concerning the terms and conditions of employment; (3) whether proposals were 
made and responded to; (4) whether UTA informed the Union that it was making a 
"final" offer; and (5) whether the Union rejected that offer. 
The court could then determine whether the parties were in fact at impasse, and 
whether UTA (and the Union) had bargained in good faith. In making this determination, 
the court could draw on case law from the National Labor Relations Board and the 
federal courts as persuasive, though not binding, precedent, as contemplated by Section 
13(c). There is nothing particularly unusual or specialized about these concepts. 
3
 The Union may argue that Section 813 really only deals with UTA and the Union, 
because it only applies by its terms to public transit workers. The Court should consider 
the fact, however, that Section 813 deals with basic concepts of labor law that logically 
would have relevance for all Utah public employees who are represented through 
collective bargaining. 
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Furthermore, these decisions would be public and subject to appeal, unlike the decisions 
of private arbitrators, and most importantly, such decisions would declare the law of 
i 
collective bargaining in the state of Utah. 
3. Out-of-State Arbitrators Should not Decide Fundamental Issues of 
Utah Labor Law. I 
Not only do arbitrators lack special expertise on the issue of bargaining in good 
faith to impasse, as a practical matter, a private arbitrator will always be drawn from 
i 
outside Utah, and will be ill-equipped to apply Utah law. It is a well-known fact that 
Utah has relatively few unionized employers, with the consequence that Utah has very 
few, if any, labor arbitrators. As a result, the vast majority of labor arbitrations in Utah i 
are arbitrated by arbitrators from outside Utah. For example, the arbitration between 
UTA and the Union concerning § 9(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement was arbitrated by Gary 
Axon, from Oregon. In fact, the panel of labor arbitrators provided by the American 
Arbitration Association pursuant to the 13(c) Arrangement did not even include any 
arbitrators from Utah. Allowing an out-of-state arbitrator to effectively declare issues of 
Utah law is contrary to the UMTA and the public policy of Utah. 
An out-of-state arbitrator would be ill-equipped to declare Utah law that may vary 4 
in some respects from the law in other states or as declared by the National Labor 
Relations Board. Notwithstanding the Donovan court's decision that state labor laws do 
4 
not comply with Section 13(c) unless they incorporate the essence of "federal labor 
policy," Donovan made clear that state labor laws need not precisely mirror federal labor 
law: ^ 
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Thus, Congress neither imposed upon the states the precise definition of 
"collective bargaining" established by the NLRA and the case law that has 
developed under that Act, nor did it employ a term of art devoid of all 
meaning, leaving the states free to interpret and define it as they saw fit. 
Instead, Congress used the phrase generically, incorporating within the 
statute the commonly understood meaning of "collective bargaining." The 
1964 Congress was not writing on a clean slate. Then as now, collective 
bargaining was universally understood to require, at a minimum, good faith 
negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 
Donovan, 767 F.2d at 949. Thus, Utah is free to establish its own collective bargaining 
laws, subject to the requirement that they include, "at a minimum, good faith 
negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment.55 Utah cannot develop its own labor laws and policy if it must 
be required to submit all decisions regarding those laws to arbitrators from outside the 
state, who would then make decisions that are effectively unreviewable. 
4. UTA Contends that it Bargained in Good Faith to Impasse. 
UTA agrees with much of the Union's general discussion of the duty to bargain in 
good faith. The duty to bargain in good faith requires that both parties bargain with the 
bona fide intention of reaching agreement. It does not require either party to agree to any 
particular provision, but does require each party to consider and respond in good faith to 
all requests of the other side that fall into the category of "mandatory55 subjects of 
bargaining. See generally 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law, Ch. 13.LB. 
(5Aed.2006). 
UTA also agrees that if the employer bargains in good faith to impasse, and any 
previous collective bargaining agreement has expired, then the employer is privileged to 
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make unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment consistent with its 
bargaining proposals. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1996) 
(citing cases). The Union therefore overstates the case when it asserts that unilaterally 
implementing new terms and conditions of employment is, without more, a per se breach 
of the duty to bargain in good faith. Union Brief at 19 (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 
736, 742-43 (1962)). There is no such breach if the employer has first bargained in good 
faith to impasse. Indeed, the employer in Katz made unilateral changes shortly after i 
bargaining began, and thus the Court held it committed an unfair labor practice by failing 
to first bargain to impasse. 369 U.S. at 741-42 (although ten negotiating sessions were 
I 
held between October 1956 and May 1957, employer made unilateral changes in October 
1956 and January 1957 "before, as we find on the record, the existence of any possible 
impasse"). • ' 
In this case, UTA met with the Union on numerous occasions from August until 
December 2009, and negotiated in good faith on all issues raised by either the Union or 
UTA. UTA declared an impasse in December 2009 only because it genuinely believed 
that impasse had been reached, based on the multitude of discussions in all of these 
i 
previous bargaining sessions, UTA's tender of a "last, best and final offer" to the Union, 
and the Union's rejection of that offer. Based on that determination, UTA implemented 
changes consistent with its bargaining proposals on December 21, 2009. 4 
The award issued by Arbitrator Axon found that UTA had improperly 
implemented changed terms, but not based on any alleged bad faith bargaining. Rather, 
the arbitrator determined that UTA violated the 13(c) Arrangement by failing to first 
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complete the fact-finding process, which is a procedure completely separate from 
bargaining. Neither side had ever invoked fact-finding, but the arbitrator held that a 
"status quo55 provision in the 13(c) Arrangement's fact finding procedure prevented UTA 
from making changes unless it first invoked and completed the fact-finding procedure. 
The arbitrator did not address the issue of whether UTA bargained in good faith. 
The Union "contends55 that UTA bargained in bad faith, Union's Brief at 23, but 
this is nothing more than a contention - which UTA emphatically denies. On the 
contrary, UTA believes that it bargained in good faith and that, but for the arbitrator's 
ruling on the status quo provision of the 13(c) Arrangement, its implementation of 
changes would have been entirely proper. 
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Union's request to 
compel UTA to arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good faith to impasse. That 
issue is a question of Utah state law, as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813, and as 
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, and must be decided by Utah courts, 
including this Court. 
n. THE COURT SHOULD RULE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE IS 
RENDERED MOOT BY THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND DECIDE 
ONLY THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL. 
UTA asks that the Court rule that the substantive dispute in this case was rendered 
moot by the decision of the arbitrator in the arbitration conducted pursuant to the 13(c) 
Arrangement, and decide only the procedural issue and then dismiss the case as moot. 
UTA presented its arguments in favor of this position in its Suggestion of 
Mootness and Memorandum in Support of Suggestion of Mootness. The Union 
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unsuccessfully attempted to rebut these arguments in its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness ("Union Opposition"). The Union essentially argued 
i 
that the substantive issue in the case was not moot because a court or arbitrator could 
(1) award a different and further remedy from the one already awarded by the arbitrator, 
and (2) based on the "public interest" exception to the general rule against deciding moot 
issues, provide guidance as to (a) what constitutes bad faith bargaining for future 
bargaining between the parties, and (b) whether such claims should be decided by a court -
or arbitrator. Union Opposition at 13-15, 18-21. These arguments should be rejected for 
the reasons stated below. 
A. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL REMEDY TO AWARD. 
It would be improper for a court or arbitrator to award a further and different 
remedy. The NLRB typically awards the following remedy for an employer's failure to ( 
bargain in good faith: 
The usual remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain in violation of 
Section 8(a)(5) is an order (1) to cease and desist from refusing to bargain, ^ 
and (2) upon request, to bargain collectively regarding rates of pay, wages, 
hours, and other conditions of employment. 
2 The Developing Labor Law Ch. 32.IILB. 1 .d.(l). In addition, where the Board 
I 
determines that the employer wrongfully made unilateral changes without first bargaining 
to impasse, the Board "usually will order that the status quo ante be restored and that 
4 
employees be made whole for any benefits that the employer has unilaterally 
discontinued." Id. at Ch. 32.III.B.l.d.(5)(a). The Board does not award unspecified 
"monetary damages," as the Union apparently contends. Union Opposition at 13. < 
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In the 13(c) arbitration, upon finding that UTA was required to complete fact-
finding before making any changes, the arbitrator ordered UTA to restore the status quo 
ante and maintain it until the parties entered into a replacement agreement, completed 
fact-finding, or reached a certain deadline. Arbitration Award (excerpts included with 
Dunn Affidavit in Addendum A) at 35. Although the arbitrator - logically - did not 
order the parties to engage in bargaining, they did so, and reached agreement. Dunn 
Affidavit, Addendum A, at ffif 5-6. 
Because of the Award and the new agreement, there is now nothing left to award. 
The Union suggests that a court or arbitrator could order UTA to (1) cease and desist; 
(2) post notices; and (3) pay damages, Union Opposition at 13, but there are no damages 
to pay and going through an arbitration or court proceeding for the purpose of possibly 
obtaining an order to cease and desist and post notices regarding alleged practices that are 
even now nearly two years old is simply not worth the trouble for the parties, the 
witnesses, or taxpayers. Even if the Union claims UTA has failed to restore the status 
quo ante, that argument should be made in a proceeding seeking enforcement of an 
arbitration award, not in an action on the merits seeking a new and different remedy. 
Accordingly, the Union's argument regarding an additional remedy should be rejected. 
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE SUBSTANTIVE 
DISPUTE. 
The Union's argument based on the public interest exception is also without merit. 
Pursuant to the public interest exception, this Court will rule on a technically moot issue 
"when the case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and 
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because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading, review." 
Ellis v. Swenson, 2000 UT 101, f^ 26 (citations and internal quotes omitted). Even then, 
the Court will rely on this exception only if it determines that it is appropriate. Id. The 
underlying issue in this case meets the first step of this test because this issue does affect 
the public interest, but fails the other two. 
1. UTA is Unlikely to Implement Unilateral Changes in the Future 
Because of the Requirement to Engage in Fact-Finding. 
4 
First, although UTA and the Union will continue to collectively bargain in the 
future, it is unlikely as a practical matter that this issue will ever arise again because of 
the arbitrator's award that, irrespective of whether it bargained in good faith to impasse, 4 
UTA must nevertheless complete the fact-finding process before implementing any 
unilateral changes. Fact-finding is a procedure that closely resembles "interest 
arbitration," except that the fact-finder publicly issues factual findings and 
recommendations rather than a binding decision. Since 1989, when fact-finding was first 
made a part of the 13(c) Arrangement, the fact-finding procedure was invoked only once 
(by the Union) and never taken to completion. Given the fact that this procedure must be 
completed before unilateral changes can even be contemplated, it is unlikely that the * 
issue of good faith bargaining will ever arise again. 
2. Even if the Issue Arises Again, it Would not Evade Review. 
4 
Second, in the unlikely event that the issues were to arise again, there is no reason 
to believe it would evade review, because if UTA implements unilateral changes after 
completing fact-finding, and the Union believes that UTA did not bargain in good faith, it 4 
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could simply file suit or initiate an arbitration and have the issue decided at that time. 
For these reasons, the public interest exception does not apply as to the substantive 
dispute in this case. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE 
ONLY, AND THEN DISMISS THE REMAINDER OF THE CASE AS 
MOOT. 
Although the substantive issue is moot and should not be considered, UTA does 
not object to consideration of the procedural question presented for appeal, that is, 
whether an allegation of an unfair labor practice (that could arguably violate Section 813 
or TI3 of the 13(c) Arrangement) must be arbitrated or decided by a court. That issue 
affects the public interest, is likely to recur in the future, and is "capable" of evading 
review. In addition, that issue has now been fully briefed. Accordingly, there is no 
further cost to the parties and issuing a decision would be an appropriate exercise of the 
Court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, UTA respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
court ruling that the underlying dispute in this case - the allegation that UTA violated 
Section 813 by failing to bargain in good faith with the Union - was subject to resolution by 
Utah's courts of general jurisdiction and not by arbitration. In addition, UTA asks that the 
Court rule that the underlying dispute is now moot and therefore that the case should be 
remanded to the district court to be dismissed with prejudice. 
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DATED this [t day of September, 2011. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
1149156 
Scott A. Hagen 
D. Zachary Wiseman 
David B. Dibble 
Attorneys for Utah Transit Authority 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 12th day of September, 2011, to: 
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq. 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Arthur F. Sandack, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 411 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ A A ^ 
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Joseph E. Hatch (#1415) 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)268-4042 
Facsimile: (801)747-1049 
Arthur F. Sandack (#2854) 
8 East Broadway, Suite 411 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 595-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Local 382 
m THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah 
public transit district, 
Plaintiff AND Appellee, 
vs. 
LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RODNEY DUNN 
CaseNo.20100940-SC 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ISS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Rodney Dunn, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That I am an adult male, of sound mind, and resident of the State of Utah. 
2. That I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this Affidavit. 
HAY QUINNEY 
MAY 2 3 2011 
& NEBEKER 
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3. That I am the duly elected President and Business Agent of Local 382 of the 
Amalgamated Transit Union, the Appellant in this case. 
4. That on December 11, 2010, the neutral arbitrator, Gary Axon, in the companion 
arbitration to this court action, rendered his decision and award. A true and correct copy of the 
decision and award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
5. That, as a result of the arbitration award, Local 382 and the Utah Transit 
Authority (UTA) resumed collective bargaining negotiations for a successor collective 
bargaining agreement. 
6. That said negotiations resulted in the agreement to a successor collective 
bargaining agreement effective April 1, 2011 through December 10, 2011. 
7. That, as part of the negotiations, Local 382 and the UTA entered into an 
agreement which preserved any claim the parties may have with this appeal. A true and correct 
copy of the agreement entitled "Release" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
DATED this \& day of May 2011. 
l<CjzdLjiuz+.f U U/ASI. 
Rodney Dunn I ' 
Rodney Dunn, appeared before me this / ^ day of May 2011 and signed this document 
in my presence and affirmed that he has read this document, understood its contents, and that the 
contents were true of his own personal knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j ^ L day of
 KM(Li0 .2011. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
DIANE OSBORNE 
Commission # 576984 
My Commission Expires 
December 15, 2012 
STATE OF UTAH 
i.Aa/u. f^knirr^j 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this of May, 2011,1 deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Rodney Dunn to: 
Scott A. Hagen 
D. Zachary Wiseman 
Liesel B. Stevens 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
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IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
I 
BETWEEN 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
LOCAL 382, 
Union, 
and 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
ARBITRATION BOARD'S 
OPINION AND AWARD 
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENT 
HEARING SITE: 
HEARING DATES: 
POST-HEARING BRIEFS DUE: 
RECORD CLOSED ON RECEIPT 
OF REPLY BRIEFS: 
REPRESENTING THE UNION: 
REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYER: 
PARTY APPOINTED ARBITRATORS: 
NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR 
UTA Offices 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
July27&28,2010 
Opening Briefs postmarked August 21, 2010 
Reply Briefs postmarked September 17, 2010 
September 21, 2010 
Joseph E. Hatch 
5295 So. Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Arthur F. Sandack 
8 East Broadway, Suite 411 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott A. Hagen 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Joseph E. Hatch, Union 
Scott A. Hagen, Employer 
Gary L Axon 
P.O. Box 190 
Ashland, OR 97520 
t 
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Prior to these days the parties' disagreements were not yet focused and were too fluid 
to rise to the meaning of a "labor dispute" as described in paragraph 9(a). 
The parties' CBA expired on December 21, 2009. The parties could not 
have requested fact-finding until January 12, 2010, at the earliest. Since the parties 
could not have requested fact-finding until after the CBA had expired, the status quo 
provisions of paragraph 9(g) must apply regardless of whether the parties' negotiations 
are at a stalemate. 
The Union requests that all terms and conditions of the expired CBA be 
reinstated until the parties either enter into a new agreement or until the conclusion of 
the fact-finding process and that those terms and conditions are made retroactive to 
December 21, 2009. 
B. The Employer 
ISSUE 1 
UTA argues the status quo provision found in subparagraph 9(g) of the 
Protective Arrangement "...is intended to protect the integrity of the fact-finding 
proceedings by ensuring that no unilateral changes are made during the pendency of 
those proceedings. It does not have any independent operation outside the fact-finding 
process. If neither party invokes fact-finding, there is no duty to maintain the status 
quo." Er. Br., p. 4. UTA insists it acted properly when it imposed contract terms 
following the expiration of the parties' CBA. Had the Union wished to maintain status 
quo, it merely needed to request fact-finding. Because the Union failed to do so, the 
Employer had no obligation to maintain provisions in the expired contract. 
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IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
LOCAL 382, 
Union, 
and 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
ARBITRATION BOARD'S 
AWARD 
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENT 
AWARD 
Having reviewed all of the evidence and argument, the Arbitration Board 
concludes and orders as follows: 
1. UTA violated paragraphs 9(a) - 9(g) of the Protective 
Arrangement when management imposed the terms and 
conditions for a successor Agreement prior to the invocation 
of the mandatory fact-finding process. 
2. The date of November 13, 2009 is the date the labor 
dispute between UTA and ATA first arose for purposes of 
9(a) of the 13(c) Protective Arrangement. 
3. The Arbitration Board orders that all terms and conditions 
of the expired Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be 
made retroactive to December 21, 2009. The terms and 
conditions shall continue until the parties either enter into a 
successor Collective Bargaining Agreement or until March 4, 
2011, whichever comes first. If either party invokes fact-
finding on or before March 4, 2011, then the terms and 
conditions of the expired Collective Bargaining Agreement 
shall continue, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the 
parties, until the conclusion of the fact-finding proceedings. 
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4. The Arbitration Board will retain jurisdiction for a period of 
60 days from the date of the Award to resolve any questions 
arising out of the remedy so ordered. 
Gai#7fc-Axon / 
Neutral Board Member 
Dated: December 11, 2010 
(Qatr^h * 
0 
Joseph E. tiatch 
ATU Appointed Board Member 
Concur>t)issent 
Dated: December/^ , 2010 
v^ 
/ftxV\&M? \i!/W\ 
Scott A. Hagen O 
UTA Appointed Board Member 
Concur// Dissent 
Dated: December l b , 2010 
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